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THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALSITS HISTORY, ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
DANIEL WALKER* AND C. GEORGE NIEBANKt

When a civilian "supreme court" for the review of court-martial

convictions was first proposed in Congress, it evoked immediate,
vociferous and emotional reactions from those most directly concerned
with military criminal law. Vigorous opposition came from the traditional militarist, who argued that there was no place for civilians in a
military procedure, and that creation of such a court would place unnecessary emphasis on civilian influence. It was said that military effectiveness would be unduly restricted and that the nonmilitary mind
would not be able to appreciate fully the military problems often
involved in court-martial cases. Some of these officers also predicted
that such a court, organized along traditional appellate lines, would
not be able to cope with the tremendous volume of cases that would
come before it.
On the other side were the adherents of the Court proposal - composed principally of civilian lawyers and veterans, speaking through
their national organizations, who had, from experience, acquired a
distaste for the court-martial system. Congressmen representing this
viewpoint hailed the Court as the "most vital element" in the reformation and unification of military criminal law brought about by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It was stated that the legislation
creating the Court embodied the "most revolutionary changes which
have ever been incorporated in our military law."
The Court has now been in existence for something more than a year.
Enough time has passed to enable the interested, nonprejudiced observer to form a preliminary evaluation of this new addition to the
judiciary. He will probably conclude that the actual result - as is
usually the case -lies somewhere between the pre-birth claims and
arguments of the proponents and opponents.
To others must be left the task of examining for this symposium the
principal product of the Court - its written opinions. In this article
we propose to spell out its development, organization and operation.
Taken together with the information concerning the Code and the
Court appearing elsewhere in this issue, it may enable the reader to
form a preliminary judgment as to the desirability and efficacy of
civilian review of court-martial convictions.
* Commissioner,

United States Court of Military Appeals; member, Illinois

Bar; formerly law clerk to Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson. The editors of the
Vanderbilt Law Review wish to acknowledge and express their appreciation
for the service Mr. Walker has rendered in the planning and execution of this
Symposium.
t Commissioner, United States Court of Military Appeals; member, New
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COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To understand the operation of the Court, it is necessary that it be
placed in context, that it be considered in light of the historical development Sf the concept of post-trial review of court-martial convictions. The Court is, of course, the product of a reform movement,
and, as such, did not come into being overnight, but was produced by
the slow-working catalyst of experience. Its roots lie in the historical
development and improvement of military criminal law, a history
that is marked by repeated conflicts between military commanders and
interested civilians. These conflicts were, however, relatively minor
altercations until the twentieth century, when large citizen armies in
two World Wars brought millions of Americans, including many
lawyers, into intimate contact with the court-martial system.
As is well-known, courts-martial have traditionally been regarded
as a disciplinary command function. They have long been thought by
the military - and some apparently still hold to this view - to be not
courts at all, but agencies of the commander to investigate facts and
recommend disciplinary action. In practice, there was little inclination
to give undue consideration to rights of accused persons. All who
have been in the service know of the sometime prevalent view that
"only the guilty are brought to trial anyway, so why bother about
the formalities." Until relatively recent years, courts-martial were
governed not by principles of law, but by the whims and desires of the
commander who appointed the court. As the Judge Advocate General
of the Army put it in 1919, "The fittest field of application for our
penal code is in the camp. Court-martial procedure, if it is to attain
its primary end, discipline, must be simple, informal, and prompt .... "
This emphasis upon quick and effective punishment for wrongdoers
naturally carried with it opposition to the introduction of effective and
thorough legal appellate review of court-martial convictions. From
1776 to the First World War, post-trial review was limited in most
cases to the action of the "convening" or "appointing" authority -the
military commander who appointed the court. Only dismissed officers, general or flag officers and those under penalty of death were
entitled as of right to high-level post-conviction review. Even after
The Judge Advocate General of the Army assumed the power to review
all general court-martial cases during World War I, his action was
limited to making "recommendations" to the convening authority recommendations which that officer could - and quite often did reject if he so desired.
Civilian concern became a major factor during the First World War.
Congress made an exhaustive study of the system and in 1920 made
substantial changes, some of which merely codified improvements
effected through administrative action during the war. Statutory au-
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thority was provided for creation of service Boards of Review in the
office of The Judge Advocate General of the Army. These boards were
required to review all court-martial convictions that resulted in sentences including disciplinary discharges, confinement for bne year, or
anything more severe. It was also required that a convening authority
obtain the advice of his legally trained staff officer before taking posttrial action on any case. These were major steps forward, but it
should be noted that these changes affected only the Army. The Navy
operated under an almost completely unaltered set of Articles for the
Government of the Navy from 1862 until the Uniform Code of Military
Justice became effective in 1951.
Unfortunately, the 1920 changes, even with minor amendments made
between then and the inception of World War II, did not remove all, or
even most, of the system's deficiencies. Many accounts of injustices,
not remedied on review, became public during the late war. Civilian
lawyers in uniform were appalled at the operation of the military
criminal system. Most vigorously criticized of all was the concept of
"command control." Many observers-

and participants

-felt

that

giving to one officer the power to decide which cases should be tried,
which court they should be referred to, which officers should sit on the
court, which officers should represent the Government and the accused,
and which cases should be approved or disapproved on review, was
completely indefensible. It was pointed out that the future careers of
officer-participants in the criminal prosecution scheme were dependent,
to a great extent, upon the convening authority. By controlling privileges, duties, promotions and fitness reports, he could effectively control any court created under his command.
Bar associations and veterans organizations became arQused as never
before. The first result was a series of studies initiated by the military
and by Congress, which culminated in the Elston Act of 1948, applying
to the Army many of the reforms later made applicable to all the
services by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. After a year of
operation under this statute, Congress deliberated on and passed the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which provided the new addition
to the judiciary, the "GI Supreme Court."
As already noted, the Court was not created without considerable
conflict. At the time of its creation, there already existed in The Judge
Advocate General of the Army's office a Judicial Council - a "super"
Board of Review. Many of the military witnesses before Congress
advocated that such a judicial council be made the top reviewing
authority under the Uniform Code. Others proposed that the three
Judge Advocates General sit together as the supreme reviewing agency.
Many proponents of the Court wanted it to be civilian and to have
jurisdiction -

automatic - over all court martial convictions, with

COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
power to consider both questions of law and fact. This latter proposal'
met considerable opposition, both from those who wanted to limit the
power of the Court and from those who genuinely felt that such broad
jurisdiction would so overburden it with cases that it could not
properly perform its primary function as a body to enunciate carefully
and soundly reasoned principles of military law, much less act in any
supervisory capacity over the operation of the new Code.
ORGANIZATION AND JURISDICTION
The final result was something of a compromise. The civilian court
was created, but its jurisdiction, as will be noted in detail later, was
somewhat limited. The law provides for three judges on the Court each to be appointed by the President from civilian life for terms of
fifteen years -the first three to have staggered terms of fifteen, ten and
five years. There is no requirement of - nor any prohibition against prior military service by the appointees. The three judges chosen by
President Truman are Chief Judge Robert E. Quinn, Judge George
W. Latimer and Judge Paul W. Brosman. Chief Judge Quinn previously served as Governor of Rhode Island, as a Judge of the Rhode
Island Superior Court, and has acted as a Navy legal officer during
World War II. Judge Latimer came to the Court from his position as a
Justice of the Supreme Court of Utah. Prior to that, he had served as a
Colonel in the Field Artillery and General Staff Corps of the National
Guard and Army of the United States. Judge Brosman was formerly
Dean of the Tulane Law School and has a military background as an
Air Force Judge Advocate.
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited. An accused can petition for
review from a Board of Review decision if the sentence, as finally approved, extends to a bad conduct discharge or confinement for one year
or more. The Court has discretion to grant these petitions on "good
cause shown." The Judge Advocate General of a service (and the
General Counsel of the Treasury Department, acting in peacetime for
the Coast Guard) may certify to the Court any decision of a Board of
Review. Hearing is mandatory in these cases. Finally, cases with
sentences involving the death penalty or affecting a flag or general
officer must be reviewed. The Court's action is limited to questions of
law, and, on factual issues, to the usual standard of appellate review.
The Court is located in Washington, D.C., in the building formerly
occupied by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. It is placed, by statute, in the Department of
Defense, but for administrative purposes only; judicially, it is independent. Presently it is staffed by approximately 40 employees. Its
organization can best be explained by following a case through the
various channels.
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After a Board of Review has passed on -

and affirmed

-

a court

martial conviction, the accused is notified of the decision. He is told,
in writing, of his right to petition the Court of Military Appeals for
review within 30 days. If he decides to exercise this right, the petition
is filed by appellate defense counsel from the office of the Judge
Advocate General of the service concerned or by civilian counsel
retained by the accused. Sometimes -

but not always -

this will be

the same counsel who represented him before the Board of Review.
Counsel must file with the Court, as required by its rules, a petition
setting out the facts of jurisdiction together with a short brief containing the issues of law, appropriate citations and necessary arguments. Appellate Government counsel, also appointed by the Judge
Advocate General, is thereafter allowed 15 days to file an answer
to the petition.
Once the petition and answer have been received, the briefs and
record are forwarded to the Commissioners' office. The Court has, by
statute, 30 days in which to dispose of the petition. Customarily, the
Commissioners prepare memoranda on the case for circulation along
with the record and allied papers to the three judges. Aiding the
Commissioners in this task is a staff of several Legal Assistants. Not
content with relying solely upon service review, the Court insists that
in this preliminary stage each record be carefully scrutinized for errors possibly overlooked by counsel. A substantial number of cases
have already been decided on issues raised by the Court itself.
The Court, of course, makes the decision whether to grant or deny
the petition -a majority vote controlling. If it is denied, the accused
and the service concerned are notified and the case is completed. If the
petition is granted, the Court may specify an "open" grant, or it may
limit argument to certain specified issues. The order granting is sent
to the service and a copy to the accused. Counsel are then required to
file formal briefs on the issues. After the briefs are in, the case is set
for oral argument in the usual appellate manner. Prior to argument,
the Commissioners again carefully peruse the record and prepare a
hearing memorandum for the Court.
Following oral argument, a decision is reached by the judges in
conference, and the opinion is assigned to an individual judge for
preparation. Of course, there occur on this Court like any other appellate court the usual shifts between majority and dissent after assignment and before final publication.
Cases involving mandatory jurisdiction - certificates from the judge
advocates general, death cases and cases involving general and flag
officers - are handled in the same way, except that the petition stage
is omitted. As soon as the initial papers are received and the briefs
filed, the case is set down for argument.
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The Court is limited in the action it can take on a given case. Laying
aside affirmance, several possibilities are present. It can reverse and
order the charges dismissed, it can order a rehearing, or it can send
the case back to the Board of Review for further action. Neither of the
latter two courses of action can be followed if the Court finds insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support the conviction. In that
situation, the charges must be dismissed, for the military procedure unlike the civilian- does not permit a new trial in such a case.
Generally, for prejudicial procedural error, the court will order a rehearing. If a valid finding of a lesser offense can be affirmed, or if the
sentence is illegal, the court will return the case to the Board of
Review for further action. However, ordering a rehearing does not
mean that one must be held. The Code vests this decision in the
discretion of the convening authority-if that official decides that a
rehearing is impractical, he may order the changes dismissed.
Another branch of the Court's jurisdiction consists of petitions for
new trial, based on newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court.
Such petitions must be considered by the Court if the case is otherwise
in its hands for review, and it may be called upon to consider additional
evidence to decide whether there is sound reason to order a rehearing.
One of the most important functions assigned to the Court is that of
joining with The Judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces in
making an annual report on the operation of the Code to Congress,
to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Secretaries of the Service
Departments. The report is required to include statistics concerning
pending cases and such recommendations as the judges and Judge
Advocates General deem appropriate.
To date, one supplemental report containing statistics on the Court's
operations and one formal report have been filed. The latter was
divided into several sections - a joint report, followed by separate
reports for the Court and each of the services. In the joint report, it
was noted that insufficient facts were available, due to the short period
of operation of the Code and the Court, to enable the presentation of
positive recommendations concerning the many points of controversy.
Among those mentioned - but passed -were an appellate procedure
for handling the increased work load that would result from war or
national emergency; creation of a separate Judge Advocate General's
corps for the Navy and Air Force; creation of noncommand channels
for processing fitness, efficiency or effectiveness reports; convening of
courts by others than commanding officers; further limitations on
command control; return to the prior law member procedure; and
expanded factual and sentence review jurisdiction for the Court. The
joint report did make two positive recommendations: (1) that special
courts-martial be prohibited from adjudging bad-conduct discharges;
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and (2) that the report be made due at the close of the calendar year,
rather than as of May 31st of each year. The separate service reports
as well as that for the Court contained detailed statistics and general
information concerning operations. The Navy noted its opposition to
the recommendation concerning sentence powers of special courtsmartial.
It is to be anticipated that the next annual report -to be filed on
May 31, or December 31, 1953, depending on whether Congress adopts
the filing recommendation -will contain many more extensive and
controversial recommendations. The Court has already commenced
laying the groundwork for the next report by creating a civilian committee to investigate and study Code operations and return appropriate
recommendations. It is thought that this committee will be especially
helpful in obtaining the benefit of the knowledge, thought and experience of the civilian bar.
REvIEw OF OPERATIONS
A consideration of the work of the Court at this date requires some
statistical information in the interest of thoroughness and for what
it may contribute to a comprehension of the scope of its labors in the
sphere of military law administration, as well as an understanding of
the physical burden it carries.
The first case to reach the Court was United States v. McSorley (1),
1 CMR 84 (USCMA 1952), which was docketed July 8, 1951, some five
weeks after the effective date of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
May 31, 1951. September 7, 1951, marks the date of the first arguments
heard by the Court, and United States v. McCrary (4), 1 CMR 1
(USCMA 1952), enjoys the distinction of being the first case argued.
The McCrary case was also the first to be decided; the decision therein
was handed down November 8, 1951. Undoubtedly the McCrary case
caused some immediate apprehension in those following the course
of the Court, for, rather than being a unanimous decision, it provoked
separate expressions from each of the three judges. Judge Latimer
announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion of his own;
Judge Brosman concurred in part with Judge Latimer and in part with
Chief Judge Quinn, who dissented. The succeeding months have
demonstrated, however, that McCrary was not a portent of things to
come, for the degree of unanimity, generally speaking, has been high.
From the date the McSorley case was filed, July 8, 1951, through and
including November 1, 1952, 1730 cases were received by the Clerk's
office. Of these, 1633 were received solely by petition of the accused, 87
by certificate of a Judge Advocate General, and 10 were cases in which
the death penalty had been imposed. Although the figure fluctuates a
bit, the Court is currently granting review in about 15 per cent of the
STATISTICAL
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petition cases. On November 1, 1952, final action had been completed in
1298 of the 1730 cases filed. As -allwould expect because of its predominance in number of men, the Army has been the source of many more
cases than any other Service. The Navy, the Air Force and the Coast
Guard follow in that order. Geographically, the overseas commands,
particularly Korea, have produced far more cases than units located
in the continental United States.
Although no precise figures are available, it is roughly estimated that
only about 10 per cent of the cases decided by the Boards of Review
are brought to the Court. Why the figure is so low can only be the
subject of speculation. In some of the cases, the sentence has been
remitted or served and there is no desire for further review. Undoubtedly, a great number are of the "open and shut" variety in which
it is obvious to anyone that a petition would be futile. In others, where
accused has been sentenced to a punitive discharge, he may not want
to have execution of the discharge delayed, preferring to get out of
service as soon as possible no matter what the conditions. Finally, some
accused may have received misguided advice, or may not know or
understand the Court's functions and powers. It is quite likely that as
more and accurate information about the Court filters through the
services greater numbers of accused may seek review, increasing the
Court's burden over what it is now.
The heavy filing of cases has produced a commensurately large number of opinions. By November 1, 1952, the judges of the Court had
delivered written opinions in 161 cases, with only seven cases pending
decision from the first term's work. Of these, 152 concerned enlisted
men, seven involved commissioned officers and two were cases of
civilians subject to the Code. Obviously, the per-judge work-load has
been very heavy. Without going into a comparative statistical examination of the labors of other appellate courts here, it is a fact that the
Court's burden is at least one of the heaviest of the appellate courts in
the country. Although figures sometimes are deceiving mirrors of fact,
we may say from personal experience that these figures present an
accurate picture - the Court is a very busy organization.
Of the 161 cases decided, the result in 71 was distinctively to the
advantage of the accused, ranging from outright dismissal of the
charges to remand to a Board of Review to correct an error in sentence.
In a number of others, error was found but not regarded as presenting
a fair risk of "material prejudice to the substantial rights" of the accused.
Accused persons have the right, at their own expense, to have their
cases presented to the Court by civilian counsel. Relatively few have
taken advantage of the right, probably because of the expense element
involved. Civilian counsel who have appeared have not - for the most
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part - evidenced any undue strangeness in their venture into military
law. And, in truth, there is little reason why they should, for the Code
and Manual have brought to the military procedures and concepts entirely similar in most essential respects to those well-known on the
civilian scene. One short-coming evidenced by privately-retained counsel is lack of familiarity with the Court's opinions. It is expected that
this difficulty will be alleviated shortly, for the Lawyer's Co-operative
Publishing Company of Rochester, New York, has undertaken to
publish the Court's opinions in the customary form.
By November 1, 1952, 244 civilian lawyers had been admitted to
practice before the Court. One might suppose that most of those retained would be from Washington, and percentage-wise that is so.
However, already lawyers from points scattered around the country
have appeared, so that the Washington bar certainly has no monoply
in the field. Accused and their families everywhere would naturally
tend to turn first to an attorney in their own community, so no one
practicing law should be surprised to have a court-martial case come
to his office.
Service officers assigned by the several Judge Advocates General to
represent accused before the Court have done well. Their labors, taken
together with those of the Judges, Commissioners and Legal Assistants
of the Court, assure a most thorough and extensive consideration of
every case. The staffs of the Judge Advocates General are not large,
and their burden is heavy, for they must provide representation not
only for the accused but also for the Government, and not only before
this Court but also before the Boards of Review. The latter, of course,
consider many more cases than reach this Court, their mandatory
jurisdiction being much broader.
Since comparatively few cases that have come to the Court resulted
in an outright dismissal of charges, most reversals have contemplated
further action. Often the action remaining to be taken is purely corrective. Thus, a Board of Review may be required to reduce a sentence
to comply with the maximum applicable to the offense in question,
or it may be directed to find accused guilty of an offense that is lesser
included within that of which he had been charged and convicted.
In a number, however, rehearings have been ordered. Although as
noted previously, the final decision to hold a rehearing rests with the
convening authority who has the option of dismissing the charges,
rehearings actually are held in a substantial number of cases in
which they have been ordered. They pose problems of the same
nature encountered in re-trials of civilian criminal prosecutions, though
often to a much more formidable degree. Because of the mobility of
military units, and, to an even greater extent, of individual personnel,
by the time a case has run the gamut of appellate review to and through
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this Court, the witnesses have often scattered so widely that it would
be immensely difficult, if not impossible, to reassemble them for another trial. And because an accused has usually been returned to the
United States after a conviction overseas, to secure the presence of
foreign civilian witnesses at retrial of such a case, they would either
have to be brought here or the trial brought to them. Furthermore,
where an offense was committed in a combat area, the accentuated
hazards to witnesses, both military and civilian, cannot be discounted.
For these reasons, many rehearings are heard "on the record" of the
first trial, bound by the usual rules governing use of testimony at a
former trial. Such "warmed over" testimony, as all familiar with the
judicial process know, can never be as satisfactory as that received
from the lips of a witness present in court. How such proceedings
succeed in practice we are not in a position to say. But they should not
be too severely criticized, for they are probably the best solution to
an awkward and difficult situation.
THE CouRT's DEcisIoNs
To date, the Court has passed on a wide variety of legal issues arising
in the field of military criminal law. An analysis of its major opinions
is presented elsewhere in this symposium, but a brief consideration
of the general content of its work is within the scope of this article.
Recognizing the difficulty and danger of generalizing, the opinions of
the Court may be roughly said to fall within three major categories:
problems of procedure, issues concerning rules of evidence and factual
controversies. So far as the area of procedure is concerned, most of the
cases involved either transitional problems created by the change in
law or the Code provisions which made radical changes in the preexisting procedure. The latter have been particularly troublesome. A
disproportionately large percentage of the Court's cases have involved
the duties and responsibilities of the law officer - now, for the first
time, divorced from participation in the deliberations of the court, and
charged, in most essential respects, with the duties of a civilian judge.
The requirement that the law officer instruct the trial court-martial on
the "elements of the offenses charged" has been the subject of a great
many opinions. This will, without doubt, continue to provide a plentiful source of error for defense counsel until such time as all courtmartial personnel become thoroughly indoctrinated in the new procedure. Ultimately, when the present opinions relating to the technicalities of giving instruction have served their purpose, the only issues
relating to instructions will probably turn on the correctness of the
law officer's statement of the law.
Another procedural problem- which also relates to rules of evidence - is the matter of proof of prior convictions. Where two or more

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

EVOL. 6

previous convictions of an accused during his current enlistment and
within three years of the date of commission of the offense in question
are proved, those prior convictions have a direct bearing on the maximum sentence imposable. If the maximum for the offense of which he
is convicted does not include a punitive discharge and does not include
confinement for three months, the court may, because of the two or
more previous convictions, adjudge a bad-conduct discharge and confimement for three months. Almost all of the numerous cases involving
prior convictions have turned on the manner of proof. Trial counsel
seemed to have the impression that the ordinary standards of proof
did not apply to previous convictions. In its opinions, however, the
Court has repeated again and again that there are no distinctions
available. This is one current problem that will very likely disappear
completely as the procedure becomes one of settled practice.
In several cases the Court has stricken down convictions where the
record of trial disclosed that the law officer had conferred with the
court out of the presence and hearing of accused and his counsel. This
point of error, like the matter of instructions, stems from the Code's
imposing on the law officer the unfamiliar robes of a civilian judge, and
may be expected to fade as the new procedure loses its novelty.
The cases involving rules of evidence have presented some of the
Court's most serious challenges. It is obviously impossible to set forth,
in one volume the size of the Manual for Courts-Martial, all the detailed rules of evidence that may arise in criminal courts. The outline
of evidence law contained therein presents little more than a guide
to those involved in trying cases, and certainly does not settle many of
the issues that arise and ultimately reach the Court. So also, the nonlegally trained officers participating in special courts-martial cannot be
expected to grasp the complexities of the rules of evidence. It is this
area that brings to the Court some of its most difficult tasks -and,
incidentally, provides some of the most satisfying results. Where the
Code and the Manual are silent - or inconclusive - on a given point,

the Court is free to apply that rule which seems best. Guided by the
rules applied in civilian jurisdictions, particularly in the federal courts,
it can pick and choose to find the one best suited for court-martial procedure. In so doing, of course, it must ever bear in mind the differences
existing between the civilian and military communities, and the
peculiarities incident to court-martial trials. It is, however, a refreshing challenge to be relatively free of the dictates of precedent in deciding both upon the rules of evidence to be applied and the limitations
to be placed on those rules.
Finally, many cases before the Court have turned in whole or in
part on sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The Court
has adopted in this area a rather strict test, which has evoked some
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vigorous dissents. In evaluating the net effect of the evidence in the
record, the Court often is presented with the disturbing situation of an
evidentiary failure which it is clear, either from its very nature or the
"allied papers" in the record, could have been completely taken care
of at the trial level. Both trial and defense counsel frequently fail to
present all the evidence apparently available to them, and a measurable share of the Court's burden would be alleviated if counsel would
take it upon themselves to present the most complete case possible.
In a long range view of military decisional law, the Court's pronouncements on sufficiency of evidence, once the applicable standard for review was formulated, are of marginal value only. It is, however, important in the sphere of military justice that all realize that the Court
can and will review sufficiency of the evidence, for its hovering presence in that aspect of every case will serve as a significant check on
arbitrary judgement based on flimsy evidence. And certainly, so long
as the Court has the power to reappraise the total evidentiary picture
in cases coming before it, a considerable portion of its efforts will be
devoted to doing so.
The remaining opinions of the Court, not susceptible of categorization, have involved various matters, some very minor from the point
of view of establishing a substantive body of law, and others undoubtedly of great importance, such as the extent of the serviceman's
guaranty against double-jeopardy and the amenability of civilians
abroad to trial by court-martial.
TiE CouRT's FuTURE
too
early
to
make
any definite prophecy as to the role the
It is much
Court will play in the years ahead. Much depends on the extent to
which the services become accustomed - or resigned - to effectuating
the modernized policy of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In
evaluating the Court's future operations, however, it should always
be remembered that it is a court of law -intended by Congress to act
in a dual capacity. First, it has the task of building a single, unified
framework of the principles of military criminal law, a framework
within which the court-martial system can function efficiently. Second,
it must ensure that justice is done in each case that comes before it.
The extent to which it can carry out its first responsibility will of
necessity depend to a great degree on the assistance received from
the services. The Boards of Review can help by writing opinions
directed to broad principles of law, The Judge Advocates General by
using care in selecting the issues to be certified to the Court, and appellate counsel by developing more fully in their briefs and arguments
basic concepts of policy and principle, stressing not only the rules but
the reasons behind the rules. It is to be hoped that the services will, in
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the future, become more accustomed to the concept of appellate review
as it is known in the civilian judicial system. This process will undoubtedly be hastened as traditional military concepts of court-martial
review fade into oblivion. In the future, there should be a lessening of
the disagreement - prevalent in some military circles - with the view

that the Court should ever be deeply concerned with establishing sound
and enduring principles of law without regard to the effect that such
principles may have on the individual case before the Court. The
military has long tended to emphasize the importance of the individual case, failing to recognize that, if appellate agencies establish
a sound framework of law and trial authorities endeavor to work
within that framework, disposition of individual cases become much
simpler.
It is also vitally important that decisional law be disseminated
past reviewing authorities. Those men directly concerned with the
trial of cases must use the decisions of the appellate tribunals as working tools. Too long has the military trial system been one of virtually
naked ritual. Unless trial lawyers and law officers in the field have
available the appellate opinions and make a consistent effort to understand both the principles enunciated and the reasons behind them, the
work of the Court of Military Appeals will not attain its maximum
possible effectiveness.

